About the caucuses: Meaningful test

By Johan Bergenas
Iowa Presidential Politics.com

Every fourth year, Iowa is in the national public eye for its part in the political process. Yet in itself, the Iowa caucus result is meaningless, only a first small step in a long race for the presidential nomination.

At the same time, “Iowa is terribly important," as Sen. George McGovern said back in 1972. "It is the first test in the nation where we get any test at all” (p. 45). This essay addresses the process of the Iowa caucuses, explains its significance to presidential candidates and analyzes the role the media play.

In the Iowa party caucus system, in contrast to a primary, participants do not vote for their favorite presidential candidate. Instead, they go to a precinct where they discuss platform issues and select delegates to a county convention. County delegates in turn select delegates to district and state conventions; from there, delegates to the national convention are selected (p. 17).

At this first precinct level, caucus-goers gather in a local place such as a school or a church building. Candidate staffers are positioned around the room, and attendees indicate their preference by choosing to stand in the section of the room where their preferred candidate's staffers are located.

A candidate must have the support of at least 15 percent of the attendees of a precinct's caucus to get one or more delegates to the county convention. Bargaining among candidates’ supporters is common. Supporters of candidates who do not reach the 15 percent threshold commonly join forces with backers of another candidate, often following a bargaining process.

Strong grass-roots campaign tactics are needed to target the people most likely to attend their Iowa precinct caucus, typically party activists or people with strong partisan feelings. Senior citizens are also likely to turn out to support a candidate. Very young voters also may participate; in contrast to general elections, the Iowa caucus allows 17-year-olds to attend if the individual will turn 18 in time for the general election.

As McGovern said, Iowa is the “first test” where the candidate’s political platform gets exposed to the electorate. Public and media evaluations of the candidate and their platforms determine expectations and lay the groundwork for different campaign strategies -- or an end to some campaigns.

Winning electoral support is of course fundamental for a political campaign, but in Iowa it is even more important to exceed or at least not fail to meet the media's expectations. Jeani Murray, Howard Dean’s Iowa campaign manager in the current campaign, stressed that the Iowa caucus is “all about expectations.”

For example, in the 1972 Iowa caucus, Sen. Edmund Muskie won 35.5 percent of the state delegates, but the media thought he was a loser to McGovern, who received a higher-than-expected 22.6 percent. After that year's caucus, R. W. Apple Jr. wrote in The New York Times that Muskie's victory “was clouded by the unexpected strong showing" of McGovern (49). Even though Muskie was a winner in terms of support, McGovern was the winner in the media’s viewbecause he exceeded expectations, while Muskie did not. As a result, Muskie received negative news coverage of his campaign, and McGovern, the evenutal Democratic nominee, gained momentum.

Although presidential candidates view Iowa as an important kickoff for the presidential race, the media still overemphasize the importance of the Iowa caucus. In their search for hard news, journalists overlook what caucus results really mean, Winebrenner says.

The author cites political observers Thomas Patterson and Michael Robinson, who address two interesting theories about news coverage of the Iowa caucus. Patterson argues that the media tend to treat the caucus as a game where winning and losing are extremely important elements of the story. In selecting “newsworthy” events, the media look for “conflict, drama and measurable outcomes,” he argues (p. 9).

Robinson coined the term “mediality,” meaning the media give issues or candidates importance based on their newsworthiness. The media too often overlook the real significance of the issues or the candidates, he argues. Because of their efforts to create hard news focusing on specific issues, events, developments or situations, the media play a significant role in setting the political agenda in Iowa as well as nationally.

The media also pin both expectations and labels on candidates, such as “dark-horse” or “long-shot,” in the search for news. If the candidate does not fulfill expectations or cannot carry the label, he or she might not be portrayed as viable by the media.

For example, the newsworthy element of the 1988 Iowa caucus was not the two winners, Bob Dole and Dick Gephardt, but Republican Pat Robertson’s strong second-place showing ahead of Bush, who was third. Gephardt and Dole’s wins meant little in the expectation game because they were expected to fare well in Iowa. Instead, Bush and Robertson received most of the media attention, Bush for his weak third place and Robertson for his “surprising” second place.

Another media phenomenon is the “front-runner” label given to candidates based on early poll results or early and intensive campaigning in Iowa.

Jimmy Carter used Iowa's “first test” to his advantage in his 1976 campaign. Carter spend nearly a year before the caucus running a grass-roots campaign in the state. Carter received the front-runner status based on results of a November 1975 Jefferson-Jackson Day poll.

After receiving 256 votes out of 1,094, nearly double the number for his nearest rival, Carter was perceived by the local and national media as the most likely candidate to win the Iowa caucus. The poll result was soft evidence that Carter had electoral support in Iowa, but in the media's search for outcomes and results, Carter was a winner -- and winning or losing were newsworthy.

In the caucus itself, Carter was the only candidate who received delegates to the next level. Ever since, Carter’s grass-root strategy has been the standard way to campaign in the Iowa caucus.

In 1980, Ronald Reagan, was labeled the front-runner for the Republican presidential nomination based on very soft evidence. The media thought Reagan was the most viable candidate because he had money and was an experienced political campaigner who had challenged former President Gerald Ford in 1976.

However, Reagan did poorly in Iowa because he did not campaign enough in the state. Instead of Reagan, Bush won the Iowa caucus that year by 2.1 percent points. Even though the race was tight, Bush fared better than expected, and the media criticized Reagan for his poor showing; Newsweek's headline said “Bush Breaks Out of the Pack." Reagan subsequently changed his campaign tactics and campaigned significantly more in New Hampshire than he had in Iowa.

So being a “front-runner” creates high expectations and pressure to do well, and the media expect the candidate to be in Iowa a lot. “Front-runner status…is a mixed blessing” (p. 111).

This year, Howard Dean is the front-runner, giving him high media visibility and access to political forums. But the status also creates huge expectations, which can be a disadvantage.

Dean has been attacked by political opponents and has sometimes failed to remain calm in response. For example, in the debate in New York on Sept. 25, Missouri Congressman Dick Gephardt criticized Dean for having supported legislation from Republican Newt Gingrich in the early 1990s. Dean lost his temper and looked angry.

Debates also offer examples of how the media look for winners and losers. Debate coverage often emphasizes who has "won." This year, the media search for measurable outcomes, and winners and losers in pre-caucus debates, has been prominent, with cable news shows such as MSNBC's "Hardball" following debate coverage with evaluations of who has won or lost.

The media also decide when the Iowa caucus is important. Iowa Sen. Tom Harkin’s decision to run for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1992 created a “favorite son” campaign. The media expected Harkin to win a landslide victory in Iowa, and Harkin's advantage in his home state decreased the newsworthiness of the caucus. Only a failure to meet expectations would have been seen as news. Harkin got his big win in Iowa, as expected, but it was hardly noticed outside the state and it did not give him momentum going into New Hampshire.

Eight years later, in contrast, there was enormous media coverage of the Republican caucus. Kansas Sen. Bob Dole won the 1996 Iowa Republican caucus but failed to meet expectations. In the media’s eyes, Pat Buchanan was the winner; Buchanan was portrayed as a strong contender after finishing an unexpected second to Dole. Buchanan received considerable media attention after the Iowa caucus, even though he was way too radical to win the Republican nomination.

Labels, a "game" focus, expectations and the media’s search for hard news make the Iowa caucus a national event, even though the result does not have any essential meaning by itself.

E-mail Johan Bergenas at johan-bergenas@uiowa.edu.